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 Research Highlights: 
 We demonstrate for the first time that children as young as four years are susceptible 
to temporal binding. 
 Temporal binding in children appears to be grounded in causal knowledge rather than 
intentional action. 
 The early-developing bidirectional relation between time and causation may be a 
useful heuristic that helps young children learn causal relationships. 
 
Abstract 
It is well-established that the temporal proximity of two events is a fundamental cue to 
causality. Recent research with adults has shown that this relation is bidirectional: events that 
are believed to be causally related are perceived as occurring closer together in time—the so-
called temporal binding effect. Here we examined the developmental origins of temporal 
binding. Participants predicted when an event that was either caused by a button press, or 
preceded by a non-causal signal, would occur. We demonstrate for the first time that children 
as young as four years are susceptible to temporal binding. Binding occurred both when the 
button press was executed via intentional action, and when a machine caused it. These results 
suggest binding is a fundamental, early developing property of perception and grounded in 
causal knowledge.  
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 Introduction 
Causal beliefs ground our understanding of the world: they allow us to explain our 
observations and make predictions. Hume (1888) made temporal contiguity—the closeness of 
two events in time—part of his definition of causation, and psychologists showed that this is 
indeed a fundamental cue in causal inference (Dickinson, 2001; Shanks, Pearson & 
Dickinson, 1989; Buehner & May, 2002, 2003). However, recent research suggests that the 
relation between time and causation is more complex than the Humean view suggests. Not 
only does the timing of events influence causal beliefs, but causal beliefs themselves also 
affect our perception of the timing of events. Thus, events that we believe are causally related 
are perceived as occurring closer together in time (Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 
2009; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & Obhi, 2012).  
 This temporal binding effect is robust and has been demonstrated in adults using a 
variety of paradigms (e.g., Desantis, Hughes & Waszak, 2012; Engbert & Wohlschläger, 
2007; Nolden, Haering & Kiesel, 2012). It is seen as a generalized consequence of causal 
beliefs, rather than as occurring only in the context of intentional actions: temporal binding 
occurs for voluntary and involuntary (Dogge, Schaap, Custers, Wegner, Aarts, 2012; 
Buehner, 2015) as well as mechanical causal actions (Buehner, 2012), and is moderated by 
the contingency between events (Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009).  
The phenomenon of temporal binding sheds new light on the relation between time 
and causation in adults, but we know very little about its developmental origins. Is children’s 
experience of time similarly influenced by their causal knowledge? Young children’s causal 
beliefs are strongly affected by temporal information, including temporal order (Bullock & 
Gelman, 1979; Rankin & McCormack, 2013; Rottman, Kominsky & Keil, 2013) and 
temporal contiguity (Mendelson & Schultz, 1976; Schlottmann, 1999). Perhaps the 
 bidirectional relationship between time and causality is a fundamental invariant property of 
our perceptual and cognitive system, in which case we would expect binding to be present 
from early childhood. There appears to be a privileged relation between time and causation in 
children: children prioritize temporal information over other types of cues such as statistical 
information (McCormack, Frosch, Patrick, & Lagnado, 2015) and knowledge of causal 
mechanisms (Schlottmann, 1999), suggesting that the use of temporal information to infer 
causality may be automatic and developmentally basic (Schlottmann, Allen, Linderoth, & 
Hesketh, 2002). It is thus possible that the close relation between time and causation seen in 
childhood works both ways: that children not only rely heavily on temporal cues in forming 
causal beliefs, but that such beliefs also affect their perception of time. 
Despite the intuitive plausibility of the claim that children are susceptible to binding, 
the only two developmental studies that have investigated it seem to provide evidence against 
it. Cavazzana et al. (2014, 2017) found that 8- to 11-year-olds did not show temporal binding. 
This suggests a very different hypothesis: that binding emerges late. Perhaps temporal 
binding requires sustained experience of interacting with causal events, or perhaps this sort of 
top-down process requires late-developing cognitive resources. To decide between these 
hypotheses, we designed a new task that was much simpler than that used by Cavazzana et 
al., and thus could be used even with young children.  
Experiment 1 
Participants completed a stimulus anticipation task adapted from previous research 
with adults (Buehner, 2012). There were two conditions, causal and non-causal, which were 
each run with two target intervals (900 and 1300 ms, to give the impression of different tasks; 
Figure S1a). Children anticipated when a rocket or a jack-in-a-box would launch by trying to 
launch a matching stimulus at the same time (see Figures 1 and 2). In the causal condition, 
 launching occurred at a fixed delay after participants’ button press; in the non-causal 
condition launching occurred after an arbitrary warning signal. Thus, while the interval 
between the initial event (button press or warning signal) and the stimulus launch was 
identical in both conditions, the events were causally linked in the causal condition only. If 
temporal binding is present, participants should underestimate the interval between the two 
events in the causal condition relative to the non-causal condition, reflecting their subjective 
impression that the stimulus launch occurred earlier when it was caused than when the two 
events were not causally related. 
Method  
Participants 
One-hundred and seventy-two children, recruited from schools (N = 92) and a science 
museum (N = 80) participated. We split these into four age groups: 36 four- to five-year-olds 
(Mage: 4.53 years; 21 females), 55 six- to seven-year-olds (Mage: 6.38 years; 26 females), 46 
eight- to nine-year-olds (Mage: 8.65 years; 25 females), and 34 ten- to eleven-year-olds (Mage: 
10.56 years; 19 females). An additional eleven children were excluded due to poor 
concentration (N = 4), because they did not understand the task instructions (N = 3), or due to 
technical issues (N = 4).  
Materials  
The experiment was conducted on a laptop with a screen refresh rate of 60 Hz running 
E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology software tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Participants responded using two 
buttons (green and yellow on the left/right) on a response box. The initial stimuli were an on-
screen depiction of a jack-in-a-box (JIAB) and a rocket standing in a gantry; the target stimuli 
were the jack popped from its box and the rocket launched from the gantry (see Figures 1 and 
2). In addition, there were matching stimuli on the right of the screen, used to elicit 
 participants’ anticipation of the target outcome. These were mirrored versions of the jack or 
rocket in the initial training phase, but were obscured by an on-screen curtain or clouds in the 
experimental phase. In the causal condition, the target stimulus had a depiction of a green 
button attached to it. This illuminated when the participant pressed the green button on the 
response box and was accompanied by a 200ms tone. In the non-causal condition, the target 
had a blue light attached to the centre of the box or gantry which illuminated when the 
warning cue was initiated along with a 200ms tone. When the target stimulus launched this 
was also accompanied by a 200ms sound. The color of the stimuli changed when the time 
interval changed (from 2000ms in the practice phase to 900ms to 1300ms in the experimental 
phases; see below) to highlight that these were different versions of the stimulus and so could 
launch at different times.  
Design & Procedure 
Participants’ task was to launch an identical stimulus at exactly the same time as the 
target stimulus. Two factors were manipulated: 1) whether the target’s launch was preceded 
by a causal action (button press) or a non-causal signal; and 2) the delay between the causal 
action/non-causal signal and the target stimulus’ launch (900ms or 1300ms, following 
previous work with adults, e.g. Buehner, 2012).  Participants completed four 20 trial 
experimental blocks: one causal and one non-causal for each of the two delays (Figure S1a). 
On causal trials, participants had to press the green button to produce the target launch; on 
non-causal trials, participants had to monitor the screen for the warning cue preceding the 
target launch. In causal trials, participants pressed the green button when they were ready; in 
non-causal trials, the warning cue occurred at a variable interval between 2300ms and 
2800ms after trial intialization. On causal trials, participants’ button press immediately 
triggered a 200ms beep; in addition, the on-screen representation of a green button 
illuminated for 200ms. On non-causal trials, the warning cue consisted of a 200ms beep and 
 an on-screen illumination of a blue light mounted on either the rocket gantry or the JIAB for 
200ms. This was done to keep the audio-visual experience of causal and non-causal trials as 
similar as possible.  Following a set interval of 900ms or 1300ms after the causal action or 
non-causal signal, the target stimulus launched accompanied by a 200ms sound (either a 
rocket launch sound or a “boing” sound). Participants’ task was to anticipate the target’s 
appearance by pressing the yellow button on the response box to launch a matching stimulus 
so that it appeared at exactly the same time. The matching stimulus always appeared 
immediately upon pressing the yellow button. The dependent variable was participant’s 
judgment error – the time they launched the matching stimulus relative to the actual 
appearance of the target stimulus.   
Each condition had a demonstration phase (4 trials), a practice phase (to criterion of 3 
trials correct), and two experimental phases (20 trials for each time interval; Figure S1a). In 
the demonstration phase, the matching stimulus appeared on its own and participants 
launched it four times using the yellow button, demonstrating that the matching stimulus 
launched immediately upon button press. In the practice phase, participants were introduced 
to the target stimulus, and they practiced launching the matching stimulus at the same time as 
the target stimulus. In this phase, the target stimulus launched after 2000ms (so the intervals 
experienced in the test trials were novel) after the participants’ first button press (causal 
trials) or the warning cue (non-causal trials). Participants were told that their task was to 
ensure that the faster matching stimulus launched at the same time as the slower target 
stimulus; there was a cover story according to which the jacks wanted to jump out at the same 
time/the astronauts in the rockets wanted to launch at the same time because they were 
friends. In the causal condition they were then told: “You press the green button here to make 
this jack-in-a-box/rocket start to get ready to pop, wait just a little while, and then you press 
the yellow button here at exactly the time you think the first jack/rocket will appear. Try not 
 to press the yellow button too early or too late, you want both jacks/rockets to pop out at the 
same time. If you manage to make them pop out at the same time, you will get a point and a 
smiley face will appear on the screen.”  Instructions for the non-causal condition were the 
same but participants were told that a light would come on and a sound play (the warning 
signal) when the jack/rocket on the left-hand side of the screen was getting ready to launch. 
Participants had to get three trials in a row correct (defined as launching the matching 
stimulus within a 1000ms window centred on the target launch time) to proceed to the 
experimental phase. A smiley face appeared each time they got a correct response; this 
feedback was only provided during practice.  
In the experimental phase, participants were told that there were different colored 
rockets/jacks in each block, and that these took slightly different amounts of time to launch. 
Also, the matching stimulus was covered up with either an on-screen curtain (for the JIAB) or 
a blue cloud (for the rocket). This was to ensure that participants had no visual feedback 
about whether their launch coincided with the target stimulus. Three factors were 
counterbalanced between participants: 1) condition order; 2) assignment of rocket and JIAB 
to the two conditions; and 3) order of intervals within each condition.  
Results  
Judgment errors (JEs) were calculated by subtracting the time the target occurred 
from the prediction response time; negative and positive scores reflect early and late 
prediction of the target event, respectively.  Each participant contributed one median JE per 
condition to the analysis (see Buehner 2012 for a similar approach), calculated from their last 
10 trials in a block. Response times that were <200ms or >2000ms were removed, resulting 
in the loss of 3.7% of trials (the number of trials excluded did not differ significantly between 
conditions, see Table S1 and accompanying text). Preliminary analyses of JEs found no 
 effects of gender, condition order or stimulus assignment and no significant interactions; 
these factors were not analysed further. 
A 4 (age group) x 2 (time interval) x 2 (causality: causal or non-causal) mixed 
ANOVA showed that JEs were more anticipatory in the causal (M = -154.2ms) than the non-
causal condition (M = -66.8ms), F(1, 167) = 31.43, p < .001, = .16 (Mdiff = 87.44; 95% CI 
[56.65, 118.24], Figure 3). JEs were also more anticipatory at 1300ms (M = -156.0ms) than at 
900ms (M = -64.9ms), F(1, 167) = 58.29, p < .001, = .26 (Mdiff = 91.08; 95% CI [67.53, 
114.64]). There was also a main effect of age group (F(3, 167) = 5.12, p = .002, = .08), 
with 4- to 5-year-olds showing more anticipatory responses than all other age groups 
(posthoc pairwise comparisons, ps < 0.005). These main effects were qualified by an interval 
by age group interaction, (F(3, 167) = 11.07, p <. 001, =.17). Simple effect analyses 
revealed that JEs were significantly more anticipatory at 1300ms than 900ms for the three 
youngest age groups (ps < .017) but not 10- to 11-year-olds (p = .147). 
To examine whether binding magnitude changed developmentally, we calculated 
binding scores by subtracting participants’ JEs in the causal from JEs in the non-causal 
condition for each interval (Figure 4). A 4 (age group) x 2 (interval) mixed ANOVA revealed 
no significant effects of age group (F(3, 167) = 1.60, p = .192,  = .03) or interval (F(1, 
167) = 0.70, p = .792,  = .00)  on binding score, and no interaction (p = .937).  
Discussion 
The results suggest that causal beliefs do shape children’s experience of time: 4- to 
11-year-olds predicted an event would occur earlier when it resulted from a prior causal 
action (button press) compared to when it merely followed a predictive signal. This is the first 
evidence that temporal binding is present in children as young as four years. Our findings 
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 contrast with those of Cavazzana et al. (2014, 2017) in suggesting that the relation between 
time and causality is bidirectional early in development.  
While we aimed to make the conditions of Experiment 1 as similar as possible in 
terms of surface-level features, the fact that participants executed the initial button press in 
the causal condition introduced some potential confounds. First, the two conditions differed 
with respect to the attentional and motor demands: specifically, the causal condition required 
participants to plan and execute two motor actions rather than one, and the fact that only the 
causal trials were self-initiated could have meant that children were more attentive in this 
condition. In addition, the results of Experiment 1 do not allow us to establish whether 
temporal binding in children is driven by the causal relation between events (as has been in 
adults, Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humpreys, 2009), or whether intentional action is critical, 
as these factors were confounded in the causal condition. It is also possible that causality is 
sufficient for binding to occur in children but intentionality modulates the effect: there is 
some evidence that binding in adults is stronger when the cause is one’s own intentional 
action (Buehner, 2012) although this has not been consistently demonstrated (Poonian, 
McFadyen, Ogden, & Cunnington, 2015). There is also evidence to suggest that children’s 
actions have a special status in causal learning (Kushnir & Gopnik, 2005; Meltzoff, 
Waismeyer & Gopnik, 2012), though there are also cases that suggest no advantage for 
learning on the basis of one’s own actions (McCormack et al., 2016). Thus, while we predict 
that causality will be sufficient for binding to occur in children, it is unclear whether temporal 
binding is expected to be stronger in children when the cause is their own action.  
Experiment 2 aimed to (1) replicate the binding effect in children; (2) rule out that 
differences in attention and motor demands might explain our Experiment 1 results; and (3) 
tease apart the relative contributions of causality and intentional action to the temporal 
binding effect. 
 Experiment 2 
We used the same task, but introduced a third machine-causal condition, where a non-
intentional machine pressed the button to launch the stimulus. Thus, there were three 
conditions (non-causal, self-causal and machine-causal), each run with a single target 
interval of 900 ms (Figure S1b).  If attention and motor demands drove what looked like a 
binding effect in Experiment 1, then in Experiment 2 JEs should be comparable in the non-
causal and machine-causal conditions, given that both conditions only involve performing a 
single action and neither of these trial-types is self-initiated. With regards to disentangling the 
contributions of causality and intentionality: if binding results from a causal connection 
between action and outcome, it should persist when the initiating action (button press) is not 
intentional in nature, and this would be reflected by more anticipatory JEs in the machine-
causal and self-causal conditions than the non-causal condition. If, on the other hand, 
intentionality is the critical component, binding should only be seen in the self-causal 
condition. Finally, if causality is sufficient for binding but intentionality modulates the effect, 
then we should find binding in both conditions, but it should be stronger in the self-causal 
than in the machine-causal condition. 
Method  
Participants 
Ninety-six children from schools (N =77) and a science museum (N = 19) 
participated: 29 four- to five-year-olds (Mage: 5.00 years; 16 females), 34 six- to seven-year-
olds (Mage: 6.86 years; 23 females) and 33 eight- to nine-year-olds (Mage: 8.99 years; 22 
females). An additional eight children were excluded due to poor concentration (N = 2), 
because they did not understand the task instructions (N = 4), or due to technical issues (N = 
2).  
Materials 
 The materials used were identical to those in Experiment 1, with the following 
exceptions. The stimuli consisted only of different colored rockets and the interval in the 
experimental phases was always 900ms. A custom-built machine with a timer, red button, 
and protruding lever (see Buehner, 2012, for details) was used in the machine-causal 
condition. 
Design and procedure 
The design and procedure were similar to that used in Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions. As the interval was always 900ms, the only factor manipulated was the 
event that preceded the rocket launch. There was an additional machine-causal condition, in 
which the button was pressed by a machine that was physically separate from the rest of the 
apparatus. Participants completed three blocks of 20 trials (in a counterbalanced order): one 
self-causal, one machine-causal and one non-causal. At the start of the machine-causal block, 
participants were introduced to the machine. They were told that once the machine was 
started by the experimenter pressing the red button, this started the timer running, and every 
2-5s the lever would drop down. This was demonstrated to the participant before aligning the 
machine with the response box. During the machine-causal trials, the machine was positioned 
adjacent to the left-hand-side of the response box, and every 2-5s the lever dropped down, 
which pressed the green button to produce the target launch. As in Buehner (2012) the lever 
was actually triggered via the experimenter surreptitiously pressing a remote hidden in her 
pocket. In all conditions, participants had to anticipate the target’s appearance by pressing the 
yellow button to launch the matching stimulus at exactly the same time. 
Results  
2.8% of trials were removed as outliers from the last 10 trials of the block. The 
number of trials excluded did not differ significantly between conditions (see Table S1 and 
accompanying text). Preliminary analyses showed that there were no significant effects of 
 gender or condition order on JEs. There was however a significant interaction between 
condition order and condition (F(4, 156) = 5.0, p = .001,  = .114; Figure S2), so condition 
order was included in subsequent analyses. 
A 3 (age group) x 2 (causality: self-causal, machine-causal, or non-causal) x 3 
(condition order) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant effect of causality on participants’ 
JEs (F(2, 174) = 10.00, p < .001,  = .10). Participants were most anticipatory in the self-
causal condition (M = -69.52ms), least anticipatory in the non-causal condition (M = 
11.49ms), with JEs for the machine-causal condition falling in between (M = -43.45ms; 
Figure 5).  
Posthoc pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference between JEs in the 
self-causal and non-causal conditions (p < .001; Mdiff = 81.01; 95% CI [47.35, 114.67]), as 
well as between the machine-causal and non-causal conditions (p = .006; Mdiff = 54.94; 95% 
CI [16.10, 93.78]). JEs did not differ significantly between the two causal conditions (self-
causal and machine-causal; p = 0.171). The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect 
of age group (F(1, 87) = 9.07, p < .001, = .17), with 4- to 5-year olds being significantly 
more anticipatory than the other age groups (ps < .005). The interaction between age group 
and causality was not significant (p = .706). 
To examine whether the magnitude of binding varied developmentally, we ran a 3 
(age group) x 2 (binding type: self or machine) x 3 (condition order) mixed ANOVA on 
participants’ binding scores (Figure 4b). We found no significant effect of age group (F(1, 
87) = .62, p = .539, = .01) or binding type (F(1, 87) = 1.90, p = .171, = .02; Figure 4).   
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the temporal binding effect in children, as well as the lack of 
any developmental change in strength of binding. The results also rule out the possibility that 
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 differences in attention and motor demands alone could have driven binding in Experiment 1. 
If this were the case we would have expected comparable JEs for the non-causal and 
machine-causal conditions of Experiment 2, as both conditions required children to execute a 
single key press. But JEs were significantly more anticipatory in the latter condition. 
The fact that children show temporal binding when the cause was a non-intentional 
machine supports the notion that it is a causal connection rather than intentional action that is 
necessary for binding to occur in children, as has been shown for adults (Buehner, 2012). 
This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that binding magnitude did not differ significantly 
if the button was pressed by the participant or by the machine. However, given that machine-
causal JEs were intermediate between non-causal and self-causal JEs, further exploration of 
the possibility that binding in children is modulated by intentional action is warranted. 
General Discussion 
We examined whether children’s causal beliefs shape their temporal experience. In 
contrast to Cavazanna et al. (2014, 2017), who argued that binding is late-developing and not 
present in 8- to 11-year-olds, the two experiments reported here provide evidence of temporal 
binding in children from four years of age. Specifically, young children predicted that a target 
event would occur earlier if it was causally connected to a preceding event, compared to 
when it was preceded by an arbitrary predictive signal. Furthermore, our results suggest that 
binding occurs both if the cause is intentional or mechanical in nature. This demonstrates 
that, as is the case for adults, binding for children is grounded in causal knowledge rather 
than intentionality.  
Our findings support an emerging body of research showing that top-down causal 
representations exert an influence on temporal perception (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013; 
2016). The results suggest that even for young children, temporal perception involves active 
 interpretation of bottom-up information based on available causal knowledge. Thus, time and 
causality appear to mutually constrain each other already early in development: prior work 
shows that temporal contiguity is instrumental in forming children’s causal beliefs (e.g., 
Schlottmann, 1999), and the present study demonstrates that once such beliefs are 
established, events in a causal sequence are perceived as more contiguous with each other 
than events in a non-causal one. While there was no overall effect of age on temporal 
binding, inspection of the graphs across both experiments shows that binding magnitudes 
were generally larger in younger children and this warrants further investigation. 
Speculatively, enhanced binding early in development would yield experiences in which the 
temporal contiguity between cause and effect is enhanced, which could help to preserve a 
default assumption (that events that occur close together in time are causally related), thus 
facilitating causal learning in young children. 
In conclusion, our findings support the idea of an early-developing relation between 
time and causation and extend its scope by indicating that this relation is bidirectional. Thus, 
our study is an important step in further elucidating how time and causation are related by 
shedding new light on the developmental origins of this relation.   
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Figure 1. The stimuli used in the Causal Condition of the Stimulus Anticipation task for the rocket and JIAB versions. Each of the three 
segments depicts a section of the trial. The target stimulus is the one on the left in each segment; and the matching stimulus is on the right 
covered by either a curtain or a cloud. Note that the curtain/cloud are depicted smaller than they actually were; on screen they were large enough 
to cover the matching stimulus. In the causal condition, the participant presses the green button on the response box (not depicted) to initiate the 
launch of the target stimulus. The button on the screen lights up to show it had been pressed and a tone is sounded – both lasting 200ms. After 
the set interval the test stimulus appears. The task was for participants to press the yellow button to launch the matching stimulus (under the 
curtain or cloud) at exactly the same time.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The stimuli used in the Non-Causal Condition of the Stimulus Anticipation task for the rocket and JIAB. Each of the three segments 
depicts a section of the trial. The target stimulus is the one on the left in each segment; and the matching stimulus is on the right covered by 
either a curtain or a cloud. Note that the curtain/cloud are depicted smaller than they actually were; on screen they were large enough to cover 
the matching stimulus. In the non-causal condition, the task was the same as the causal condition, except that participants waited for the warning 
cue on the rocket gantry. The warning cue was a 200ms audio-visual signal. As in the causal condition, after the set interval the test stimulus 
appeared, and the task was for participants to press the yellow button to launch the matching stimulus at exactly the same time. 
  
Figure 3. Mean judgement error for each causal condition (causal, non-causal) and interval 
(top: 900ms; bottom: 1300ms) across age groups in Experiment 1 (error bars are ± SEM). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) Experiment 1        (b) Experiment 2 
    
Figure 4. The magnitude of binding (in ms) ± SEM for each age group (a) in Experiment 1 for 
900ms (top) and 1300ms (bottom) trials; and (b) in Experiment 2 for the self-causal (top) and 
machine-causal (bottom) conditions (both at 900 ms).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean judgement error for each causal condition (self-causal, machine-causal, non-causal) and 
age group in Experiment 2 (error bars are ± SEM). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
